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This paper develops and tests a model of the relation between the volatility of the ex-
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laying emphasis on frictions in the financial market, specifically foreclosure costs to col-
lecting bad debts.  On the assumption that foreign sources of funds are crucial for domes-
tic finance, the paper tests the hypothesis of a high positive relation between the volatility 
of the exchange rate and the lending rate, and between the volatility of the exchange rate 
and capital inflows, on a sample of 54 countries over 1980-2000.  The paper finds that ex-
change-rate and macroeconomic volatility are strong predictors of capital inflows (but 
not of lending rates) and that there may be an important role for financial frictions in the 
transmission process. 
 
Moreover, the paper finds that episodes of disinflation that rely on a reduction of the rate 
of depreciation tend to be accompanied by lower exchange rate volatility (in addition to 
simply lower rates of devaluation).  Both effects, but principally the latter through finan-
cial frictions, suggest a solution to the lack of connection between the theory and the sty-
lized facts of exchange rate-based stabilizations: ERBS programs may lead to initial 
booms through should cause a significant rise in the availability of credit, even if the cost 
of credit does not fall by much. 
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Credit Rationing and Exchange-Rate Stabilization: 
Examining the Relation between Financial Frictions, Exchange-Rate Volatility, 
Lending Rates, and Capital Inflows 
 
Gabriel X. Martinez 
 
Does a reduction in exchange rate volatility lead to a lower level of interest 
rates?  If so, how?  There is much theoretical and empirical work on the relation 
between exchange rate volatility and interest rate volatility (see Belke et al. 
(2003)), and a general consensus has not been reached.   But the question of this 
paper (lower exchange rate volatility leads to lower interest-rate levels) has re-
ceived less attention. 
A connected question is the relation between exchange rate volatility and 
the availability of credit from foreign sources.  Again, there’s an intuitive connec-
tion between exchange-rate stability and capital inflows but it has received little 
formal theoretical or empirical attention. 
This paper explores these questions by developing a model of a financial 
sector that is dependent on foreign sources of funds, so the behavior (both the 
average and the standard deviation) of the rate of change of the exchange rate 
affects the average cost of funds.  Following the literature on credit rationing and 
the financial accelerator, this paper hypothesizes that, in the presence of financial 
frictions, interest rates are “sticky” but the availability of funds is not (lenders 
prefer to react to excess demand for loans by restricting the supply of credit ra-  3
ther than by raising interest rates).1  If this is so, a stabilization of the exchange 
rate (which increases the expected return to lenders), should cause a drastic in-
crease in the availability of credit and a small change in the lending rate. 
This question is very relevant to the study of exchange rate-based stabili-
zation programs (ERBS), which as Hamann (2001) points out, have generated a 
growing theoretical and empirical literature that is far from closed.  One of the 
main puzzles of this literature (see Sobolev (2000) for a short survey) is the rela-
tion between interest rates and aggregate demand in the models.  To generate the 
boom-bust pattern that is typically observed, these models (see Calvo and Végh 
(1999)) require either that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution be very 
large or that interest rates fall very significantly.  The stylized facts of ERBS indi-
cate that interest rates do fall, but, given the (very low) estimates of the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution, the magnitude of the interest-rate fall could not 
possibly generate the observed post-ERBS boom. 
Empirical estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution compare 
aggregate demand with the deposit rate.  But if changes in credit rather than sav-
ings are the major source of variation in aggregate demand, then the relevant in-
terest rate should be the lending rate (rather than the deposit rate).2  Deposit rates 
and lending rates need not move together, or in the same proportion, insofar as 
                                                 
1 Zeira (1991) developed an open-economy model where credit markets' imperfections alter basic macroe-
conomic results through credit rationing and not through interest rates.  His model did not include exchange 
rate behavior. 
2 Indeed, domestic credit is positively correlated to GDP, and lending booms are typically accompany 
ERBS programs.   4
the spread between the two is affected by the presence of credit market frictions 
(and by events such as financial liberalization) or other factors.  In this case, the 
estimated intertemporal elasticity of substitution widely understates the actual 
relationship between the relevant cost of spending and aggregate demand. 
Moreover, there are two shortcomings to most current theoretical models 
of ERBS: they give no role to the volatility of the exchange rate in financial rela-
tions and they give no role to changes in the availability of credit in the determi-
nation of aggregate demand. 
In existing models, the only effect of ERBS on the interest rate is through 
an interest parity condition (see, for example Calvo and Végh (1994), equation 
18), so there is no place for the volatility of the exchange rate to affect interest 
rates.  But ERBS not only stabilizes the exchange rate (and through it, prices), it 
also stabilizes the rate of change of these variables.  If one allows both the rate of 
devaluation and the volatility of this rate to affect the interest rate, one should 
expect to see a drastic fall in the market-clearing lending rate following an ERBS 
program – or, if one assumes that financial frictions causes equilibrium credit ra-
tioning in pre-ERBS economies – one will expect ERBS to lower interest rates by 
little but to significantly increase the availability of funds. 
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1.  The Mean and the Standard Deviation of the Rate of Change of the Ex-
change Rate 
It is convenient to start by testing the hypothesis that while E(ε), the aver-
age appreciation rate,3 is a policy variable, the standard deviation of the appreci-
ation rate, 
ε σ ε = ) ( stdev , is an decreasing function of the average appreciation 
rate.  This is very much consistent with the general experience that high inflation 
usually means highly variable inflation; insofar as there’s a high degree of pass-
through (which is the case in most developing economies that would choose the 
exchange rate as a nominal anchor), high inflation means a high depreciation 
rate.  Then a low appreciation rate (a high depreciation rate) leads to a highly va-
riable appreciation rate. 
This assumption stands to empirical scrutiny.  Using 1980-2000 data from 
the IFS on 54 countries (for details, see below), regression analysis indicates that 
low depreciation rates (that is, high appreciation rates) often lead to low variability of 
the appreciation rate. 
STDAP = 9.0951 — 0.3078*MAPPR + [AR(1)=0.9957, AR(2)= —0.2597] 
 (0.6600)  (0.0332)  (0.0312)  (0.0304) 
total panel observations = 782   adj-R2 = 0.7223  DWstat = 1.896 
                                                 
3 The theoretical model of this paper is easier to understand if we define the exchange 
rate e so that a rise in e (i.e., ε > 0) is interpreted as an appreciation.  Over 1980-2000, most coun-
tries’ currencies depreciated against the U.S. dollar; a rise in ε (an end to high depreciation), then, 
is a stabilization of the exchange rate.   6
where STDAP stands for the 5-year standard deviation of the annual apprecia-
tion rate and MAPPR stands for the 5-year moving average of the annual apprec-
iation rate. 
2.  Modeling the Open-Economy Financial Sector 
The model modifies Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (BGG 1998), by add-
ing a role for currency mismatch.  This is particularly important for developing 
countries, as has been increasingly argued since the East Asian crisis of 1997.  
Borrowers typically earn income or own assets denominated in domestic curren-
cy but borrow in foreign currency.  Banks avoid currency mismatch on paper be-
cause their deposits and loans are both in foreign currency, but a large devalua-
tion causes losses and bankruptcy by causing large default rates (and, often, a 
deposit outflow). 
This paper models this stylized fact with stark simplicity to give centrality 
to the behavior of the exchange rate.  Idiosyncratic shocks are assumed away: the 
only shock a borrower experiences is a change to the value of the currency.  The 
lenders are assumed to be international banks that can diversify across countries, 
but they experience loan-default losses if the value of the currency falls (in which 
case they must pay a foreclosure cost to collect the loan). 
Again in the interest of simplicity there is no asymmetric information, but 
the existence of a foreclosure cost causes both a backward-bending supply of 
loans and the possibility of credit rationing.  Indeed, credit rationing is essential   7
to the broader argument: interest rates fall little (but capital inflows rise much) 
during ERBS episodes.  Even more broadly, it has been argued that the conven-
tional interest-rate channel of the financial accelerator is not consistent with the 
empirical evidence, but that a credit-rationing-based financial accelerator is (see 
Boissay (2001)).  Financial frictions of this kind suggest a mechanism to explain 
these stylized facts. 
The next two sub-sections discuss the basic framework of financial rela-
tions: consumers’ demand for loans and the lender returns’ function.  The follow-
ing two sub-sections show how credit rationing arises in this model and how the 
variability of the exchange rate is related to the cost of borrowing. 
2.1  Consumers 
Consumers (assumed to be identical) live for two periods, during both of 
which they earn endowment income denominated in domestic currency, denoted 
yt.  Assume that they cannot lend this endowment, but they can borrow against 
future income.  Denominated in foreign currency, the individual’s lifetime en-
dowment is 
  e1y1 + E(e2)y2 Eq.  1 
where e is the foreign currency price of domestic currency.  Importantly, e2 is un-
certain;  ε is the (gross) appreciation rate of the domestic currency and E(ε) = 
E(e2)/e1 is the expected appreciation rate.  Assume, that consumers use the enti-  8
rety of their endowment to purchase foreign goods in the first period of their life, 
which are their only source of utility: 
 U=u(c*1). 
Given this set-up, from standard intertemporal maximization it follows that con-
sumers will maximize their utility by spending the entirety of the net present 
value of their lifetime endowment on period-1 consumption of foreign goods.  
Assuming that prices are constant and normalized to 1, 
  c*1/e1 = E(ε)y2/(1 + i) + y1. Eq.  2 
As long as y1 and y2 are non-negative, consumers will want to borrow against the 
second-period endowment to finance this consumption demand.  The lifetime 
endowment will be sufficient as long as ε ≥ E(ε). 
Consumers demand loans4 to finance the difference between first-period 
consumption demand and first-period income.  They obtain financing from for-
eign banks.  Both the loan amount L and the loan rate i are chosen by the bank 
(see below). 
  L ≤ c*1 – e1y1 Eq.  3 
In this set up, second-period income is the only source of repayment capacity for 
the borrower.  Then the total value to be repaid (interest plus principal) cannot 
                                                 
4 Following New Keynesian models (Greenwald and Stiglitz 1993, Myers and Majluf 
1984), informational asymmetries prevent the development of an equity market.  For simplicity, 
assume that borrowers can only borrow from one bank.   9
be larger (in expectation) than the foreign-currency value of second-period in-
come, (1 + i) L ≤ E(e2)y2.  It follows that there must be a value of ε, labeled ε ˆ , 
such that if ε<ε ˆ , the borrower is incapable of paying back the full amount of the 
loan (because the foreign-currency value of the second-period endowment falls 
by too much), 
  L i y e ) 1 ( ˆ 2 1 + = ε . Eq.  4 
Notice that, in this model, a depreciation (ε < 1) generally hurts borrowers by in-
creasing the foreign-currency value of their loan commitments (as compared to 
their domestic-currency denominated income) and makes them more likely to 
default on loans.  In other words, in this simple conception of financial relations, 
devaluation is always contractionary.5 
Clearly a higher i raises the threshold below which borrowers are incapa-
ble of paying back their loans.  (Notice that i is defined in terms of foreign cur-
rency units). 
BGG assume that the actual outcome of projects is private information, so 
the lender must pay a monitoring cost.  This assumption would be inappropriate 
in this context, where there are no idiosyncratic shocks and the only uncertainty 
is macroeconomic (and presumably observable).  However, lenders must pay fo-
                                                 
5 Unlike Céspedes, Chang, and Velasco (2000) we do not assume that output can be sold 
internationally, so a devaluation does not have the conventional effect.   10
reclosure costs (which are formally equivalent to BGG’s monitoring costs) on the 
assumption that borrowers can’t freely commit to repaying their loans. 
If the entrepreneur does not declare bankruptcy, he pays the lender the 
amount  2 1 ˆ y e ε  and keeps the difference between the revenue from the output 
produced and the loan plus interest (the payment amount is denominated in the 
same units as the loan amount, that is, the first-period value of the currency).  If 
he does declare bankruptcy, the borrower loses the entirety of the consumer’s 
second-period income, εy2. 
Assume, concretely, that e2 is i.i.d. across time and firms, whose density 
function is w(e) and whose continuous and once-differentiable c.d.f. is Ω(e).  Con-
sistent with the evidence presented above, we make the assumption that stdev(ε) 
is negatively related to E(ε). 
2.2  Lenders 
Consumers borrow, for simplicity, from international investors whose op-
portunity cost of funds is constant at i*and who are perfect competitors so they 
make zero expected profits.  If debtors declare themselves in default, lenders pay 
the cost µ e2y2=µ ε e1 y2, interpreted as foreclosure costs, and take possession of 
the entire output of the project.  Because the foreclosure cost is proportional to 
the output of the project, it remains significant even as production scale increas-
es.   11
On the assumption that banks, who can lend to more than one country, 
are able to diversify country risk away by pooling loans, and using the fact that 
dΩ(e) = w(e)de, the expected return to the lender must satisfy 
  ∫ Ω − + Ω − = +
ε
ε ε µ ε ε
ˆ
0 2 1 2 1 ) ( ) 1 ( )] ˆ ( 1 [ ˆ ) *)( 1 ( d y e y e L i  Eq.  5 
2.3  The Effect of a Change in E(ε) on interest rates 
What determines  ) ˆ (ε Ω , the probability that the appreciation rate will fall 
below  ε ˆ?  Suppose ε follows a normal distribution: statistical theory suggests 
that  ) ˆ (ε Ω depends both on the mean and the standard deviation of ε.  Intuitively, 
a lower standard deviation of the distribution of appreciation rates should ex-
pose lenders to less default risk, other things equal, because there are fewer states 
of nature in which the currency’s value will be insufficient for repayment.  It is 
easy to illustrate this intuitive claim. 
Moreover, a lower standard deviation also increases the typical 
ε µ 1 2 ) 1 ( e y − , that is, the amount received by the lender in case of default. 
The combination of a lower probability of default and higher default-state 
payments implies a lower equilibrium interest rate (assuming zero lender returns 
and no credit rationing).6  The relation between stdev(ε) and Ω is difficult to 
show analytically, but it is easy to develop a numerical simulation of this very 
                                                 
6 This intuitive claim must be qualified, however, because of the magnitude of the 
changes in either E(ε) or σ
ε during ERBS programs, and the presence of simultaneous programs 
of financial liberalization, etc., which may contribute to higher interest rates.   12
simple model to derive values of both Ω and δ for different levels of E(ε) and σ
ε.  
The basic data for income, expenditure, and exchange rates is Ecuadorian data 
(Ecuador applied an ERBS program in the early 1990s).  Two four-year periods 
are distinguished: 1988-1992, a low-appreciation, pre-ERBS period and 1993-
1996, a (comparatively) high-appreciation, ERBS period. 
 
Table 1 
Behavior of the Exchange Rate, Ecuador, 1988-1996 
 1988-1992  1993-1996 
Cumulative appreciation over the period  —72.22%  —49.21% 
Average monthly appreciation7 —2.57%  —1.39% 
Standard deviation of the monthly appreciation rate  3.57%  1.43% 
Source: Banco Central del Ecuador, Base de Datos de Estudios 
Note: appreciation here is defined as ε—1 
 
Following BGG, we assumed µ, the cost of foreclosure, to be equal to 0.12.  
The risk-free lender return for lenders, i*, was set at 6.63, the average U.S. Federal 
Funds rate of the period.  For simplicity (and to concentrate on the changes of the 
behavior of the exchange rate), we set y1=y2 at Ecuador’s 1988 nominal GDP (5.2 
billion sucres).  Then the only changes between scenarios were the average ap-
preciation rate and the standard deviation of this rate. 
Table 2 
Simulation Results for Ω and default payments d, given historical values of E(ε) 
and σ
ε 
  (1) (2) (3) 
                                                 
7 Recall ε is the gross rate of appreciation, so a rise in E(ε) indicates stabilization – a fall in 
the average rate of depreciation – which characterizes ERBS programs.     13
  Pre-ERBS Post-ERBS:  only 
average ε changes. 
Post-ERBS: both 
average ε and σ
ε 
change. 
Ω  6.84% 7.77% 0.45% 
d  0.113% 0.125% 2.635% 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Notes: ε = average monthly gross rate of appreciation of the currency. 
stdev(ε) = 12-month standard deviation of the monthly gross rate of ap-
preciation of the currency. 
Ω = probability of default. 
d =  L e y
d / ) 1 ( 1 2 ε µ − , where εd is the average default-causing rate of depre-
ciation. 
 
The cutoff-ε below which borrowers default is itself a function of the dis-
tribution of ε, so large changes in either mean ε or the standard deviation   
σ
ε change the entire financial relation.  Another simulation was run in which the 
average monthly appreciation rate and the standard deviation were only 
changed marginally (see Table 3).   
The simulations confirm that, indeed, a high appreciation rate and a low 
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Table 3 
Simulation Results for Ω and default payments 






average ε changes. 
(3) 
Post-ERBS: both 












Ω  18.59% 18.09% 12.33% 
d  0.082% 0.082% 1.470% 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Notes: ε = average monthly gross rate of appreciation of the currency. 
stdev(ε) = 12-month standard deviation of the monthly gross rate of ap-
preciation of the currency. 
Ω = probability of default. 
d =  L e y
d / ) 1 ( 1 2 ε µ − , where εd is the average default-causing rate of depre-
ciation. 
 
  Then differentiating equation (5) with respect to E(ε) (and remembering 











































































































.  It is therefore obvious from equation (4) and from our assumption 












The model therefore predicts a fall in interest rates when E(ε) rises, and an 
even larger fall in i when stdev(ε) is allowed to fall when E(ε) rises: by lowering 
the probability of default  ) ˆ (ε Ω and increasing the payments made by defaulting 
borrowers, a fall in stdev(ε) increases the return to the lender, other things equal.  
Because lenders make no profits in equilibrium, the interest rate paid by borrow-
ers must fall.  This is confirmed in simulations. 
 
Table 4 
Simulation Results for i for marginal changes in E(ε) and σ
ε 
  (1) (2) (3) 






i  3.052% 2.978% 2.035% 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Notes: ε = average monthly gross rate of appreciation of the currency. 
stdev(ε) = 12-month standard deviation of the monthly gross rate of ap-
preciation of the currency. 
i = interest rate on loans. 
 
As a preparation for econometric tests, let us derive a simple formula for 
the determinants of interest rates.  In the absence of default, the interest parity 
condition says that domestic interest rates and foreign interest rates should only 
differ by the expected change in the exchange rate.  i was defined above in terms 
of foreign currency units. Here we redefine it in domestic currency units.  Be-
cause  ε is the gross appreciation rate, the interest parity condition takes the   16







.  Allowing for a positive probability of de-









+ Ω − + = +   
where  ∫ Ω − = −
ε
ε ε µ δ
ˆ
0 2 1 ) ( ) 1 ( 1 d y e .  δ should vary from country to country and 
from period to period, according to things like the effectiveness of domestic 
courts (which affect µ); the existence and severity of a macroeconomic crisis 





0 ) ( d ).  This formulation allows us to see the determinants of i clearly: 
  ) 1 (
) 1 (









 Eq.  6 
Domestic loan rates should fall as the rate of appreciation rises, as interest 
parity would predict, but in addition loan rates should be lower if the typical loss 
from default is smaller; (that is, if creditor rights are enforceable and if the econ-
omy is stable); and if the probability of default, which depends on σ
ε, is lower.  
The next section confirms that the loan amount L has ambiguous effects on the 
interest rate. 
2.4  Credit Rationing 
To see clearly how the presence of financial frictions generates credit ra-
tioning, it is useful to start by finding the effect of higher interest rates on lender   17
returns.  Using equation (4), we know that 
2 1







.  Then the derivative 
of the lender’s return from loans with respect to the loan rate is 
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An increase in the interest rate increases the income of the lender in the 
case of no default, but it also raises the foreclosure costs the lender pays in case 
of default (by raising  ) ˆ (ε Ω ).  Then the effect of an interest rate rise on lender re-
turns can be positive or negative, depending on the size of the loan (assume fo-
reclosure costs are significant enough). 
Suppose we start with a very low L.  Because lender returns must be zero, 
higher interest rates must be compensated by raising L.  This is equivalent to say-
ing that (at sufficiently low levels of L) the loan supply curve is upward sloping. 
At sufficiently high levels of L, a rise in interest rates reduces lender re-
turns: to keep lender returns equal to zero, L must fall.  In other words, at high 
enough levels of L, lenders respond to higher loan demand by keeping interest 
rates more or less constant and rationing credit.  This is typically illustrated by a 
backward-bending loan supply curve.   18
The level of Lc at which borrowers are credit-rationed if market-clearing 
interest rates are higher than the interest rate that satisfies equation (5), denoted 
by î, is given by 
 
) ˆ ( ) ˆ 1 (









= .   Eq. 7 
Therefore, in the presence of credit rationing, the equilibrium quantity of 
loans will depend positively on the repayment capability of the borrower (meas-
ured by e1y2) and the probability of repayment; it will depend negatively on fo-
reclosure costs and interest rates (note, however, that î is “sticky”, which is the 
cause of credit rationing).  Recall that the probability of repayment rises if the ex-
change rate is stabilized, which implies that the equilibrium quantity of loans 
ought to rise as well. 
3.  Testing the Model 
Most studies of the stylized facts of ERBS have noted that interest rates ac-
tually fall by too little and that sometimes (e.g., during heterodox stabilizations or 
if the stabilization program is accompanied by financial liberalization) they ac-
tually rise.  Yet our model shows, in simulations, that interest rates ought to fall 
significantly when E(ε) rises and σ
ε falls.  Does this theoretical claim hold up to 
the empirical evidence?  Historically, what happens to the cost of borrowing 
when E(ε) rises? What happens when σ
ε falls?  The first sub-section tests a ver-
sion of equation (6) against on a sample of 54 countries over 1980-2000, to see if   19
interest rates are determined empirically in the manner this paper argued theo-
retically, using σ
ε as a proxy for Ω. 
We want to test three hypotheses about interest rates: 
•  That credit market imperfections and macroeconomic instability cause in-
terest rates to be higher. 
o  Besides taking away the effect of APPR on interest rates, the other 
regressors do not seem to impact interest rates, which is so counte-
rintuitive that it suggests that interest rates are not fully flexible 
and that therefore there is credit rationing in the international fi-
nancial markets. 
•  That the fall in the cost of capital following a reduction in the instability of 
the exchange rate (a rise in APPR) is too small to justify the existing theo-
retical models of exchange-rate based stabilization. 
o  Both sets of regressions suggest that, once other factors are in-
cluded in the regression, the coefficient on APPR remains signifi-
cant and of the right sign, but it becomes less than one in a statisti-
cally significant way.  This means that interest rates are “sticky” to 
changes in APPR once credit market effects are controlled for. 
•  That the stabilization of the exchange rate affects lending deposit rates by 
significantly less than it affects deposit rates.  As mentioned in the intro-
duction, the relevant cost of spending is arguably the lending rate.  If this 
interest rate changes by little when the exchange rate is stabilized, one   20
must look for other factors to explain changes in aggregate demand, such 
as credit market frictions and the availability of capital. 
o  Indeed, the coefficient on APPR is much, much smaller in LEND 
regressions than in DEPRATE regressions. 
 
Then, confronted with the evidence that changes in the volatility of the ex-
change rate and the macroeconomy seem to have little effect on interest rates, we 
hypothesize that there is credit rationing –so that interest rates are “sticky” but 
loan amounts are free to vary in response to improvements in lender returns– 
and test the hypothesis that capital inflows (which are represented by L in the 
model) are determined according to equation (7) – or rather, by equation (6) 
solved for L.  Hence, we hypothesize: 
•  That capital flows, conventionally assumed to depend on foreign and do-
mestic interest rates, as well as on risk, are also dependent on the interac-
tion between credit market conditions and macroeconomic stability. 
o  There is support for the hypothesis that countries were credit ra-
tioning is more severe (maybe due to financial market imperfec-
tions), the variability of appreciation rates or of output will have a 
large (negative) impact on capital flows. 
 
To measure credit rationing, we use two measures, one from Galindo and 
Micco’s (2001) study on creditor protection and financial cycles and another from   21
Tornell and Westermann’s (2002) study on the credit channel in middle-income 
countries. 
First, we borrow estimates for (1-µ) from Galindo and Micco (2001), who 
develop a measure of “effective creditor rights,” denoted by CRED, that takes 
into account both the legal rights of creditors and the application of the rule of 
law in the country (then 1-CRED indicates greater market imperfections).  The 
table below reports the countries in the data set, selected because Galindo and 
Micco’s measure was available for them. 
Table 5 









Hong Kong,  
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South Africa,  
Spain,  




Trinidad and Tobago,  





This measure has problems.  It combines a measure of creditor rights (de-
rived from La Porta et al. (1998)) with a  measure of the rule of law in each coun-
try (derived from Kaufmann et al. (1999)).  But some of the results are downright 
odd (see Table A.0): for example, countries like Colombia, Chile, or Portugal (and 
the United States) are found to have fewer effective rights for creditors than Zim-  22
babwe, Pakistan, or Indonesia; France has less effective creditor protection than 
Haiti; Switzerland has about the same effective creditor rights as Nigeria and less 
than Turkey or Egypt; Malaysia is found near the top of the list, just better than 
Denmark and Austria.  This suggests that regression coefficients of this measure 
must be interpreted with caution. 
The second measure of credit rationing (denoted as CRDRAT) is derived 
from Tornell and Westermann (2002), who show that, in countries where there is 
credit rationing, the relative price of non-traded goods to traded goods (proxied 
here by the real exchange rate) is positively correlated to the rate of growth of 
real domestic credit.  They argue that non-traded goods producers are typically 
credit constrained (say, because of asymmetric information) while traded goods 
producers have access to international financial markets.  If this is true, a rise in 
the relative price of non-traded goods should lead to a rise in the availability of 
credit to this sector.  This “credit channel” is not present in countries where there 
are no credit market imperfections (here, where non-traded goods producers are 
capable of borrowing from international markets).  It follows that a strong and 
positive correlation between the real exchange rate and the rate of growth of real 
domestic credit can be taken as a proxy for credit market imperfections.   
CRDRAT has been defined as a 5-year correlation.  
Theory suggests an interaction term between CRED or CRDRAT and ma-
croeconomic conditions.  Creditor rights should be harder to enforce during eco-
nomic downturns and/or exchange rate market disarray; countries with a histo-  23
ry of macroeconomic volatility and low growth are likely to have lower effective 
creditor rights: of two unstable countries, the one with poorer credit markets 
should experience lower capital flows, and vice versa.  CRDRAT is negatively 
correlated with the average growth rate of real GDP in most regions, and it is po-
sitively correlated with the standard deviation of the real growth rate and the 
appreciation rate.  The implication is that faster-growing countries and countries 
with more macroeconomic stability have lower credit market frictions. 
  We also include an interaction term between the credit market variables 
and the standard deviation of the appreciation rate, STDAP, on the assumption 
that higher exchange-rate variability will reduce capital flows more if the domes-
tic financial system has more frictions. 
In addition to µ, we use the US Federal Funds rate as i*, the opportunity 
cost of funds for the international lender.  We obtained IFS data for the lending 
rate, the exchange rate, and GDP at 1995 prices, over 1980-2000, for the 54 coun-
tries listed in Table 5.8  Tables A.1 – A.6 at the end of the paper report the results 
of different versions of an econometric model based on equations (6) and (7). 
3.1  Regressions with the Deposit Rate and the Lending Rate as the Dependent 
Variable 
Following interest parity, the domestic lending rate (LEND) and the depo-
sit rate (DEPRATE) should move one-to-one with the opportunity cost of funds 
                                                 
8 We excluded the hyperinflationary episodes in Argentina and Brazil from the data set 
as well as outlying observations for the rate of appreciation in Nicaragua (in 1988 and 1991).   24
(FEDFUNDS, positively) and the appreciation rate (APPR, negatively).  Weaker 
effective creditor rights (1-CRED or CRDRAT, a higher µ) should lead to higher 
interest rates.  A higher σ
ε raises the probability of default and so puts upward 
pressure on domestic interest rates.  We’ve assumed a version of the “original 
sin” hypothesis by defining STDAP as the standard deviation of the appreciation 
rate over the previous 5 years, so that expectations about future default rates are 
based on a recent history of exchange rate volatility.  Low volatility of real 
growth rates (STDGDP), should be accompanied by lower rates of default on 
loans and therefore lower interest rates. 
As can be seen from Tables A.1 - A.4, the coefficient of APPR is significant 
and has the sign implied by interest parity in all the regressions (both with DE-
PRATE and LEND as the dependent variables), but the magnitude of the coeffi-
cients requires comment.  Table 6 (which summarizes the results) suggests that 
APPR has a much larger effect on the depreciation rate than on the lending rate 
and that this effect is very sensitive to credit market frictions.  In particular, when 
credit market frictions are measured by Tornell and Westermann’s indicator, the 
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Table 6 
Coefficients of APPR in regressions with DEPRATE and LEND as dependent va-





With Galindo and 
Micco’s index 
(average) 



















adj-R2 Statistic       
In DEPRATE 
regressions 
0.1399 0.1365  0.4929 
In LEND 
regressions 
0.2179 0.2388  0.4834 
 
Contrary to intuition, macroeconomic and exchange-rate stability do not 
seem to affect deposit or lending rates much; the coefficients are generally of the 
wrong sign and insignificant. 
There is weak support for the hypothesis that the effect of stabilization on 
lending rates is related to financial frictions, as shown in Table 6, and by the fact 
that the interaction terms in Tables A.1 - A.4 are all of the expected sign and only 
marginally insignificant.  Tornell and Westernmann’s indicator seems to be supe-
rior to Galindo and Micco’s, at least by the adj-R2 criteria.   
In conclusion: consistently with the stylized facts of ERBS, in which a sta-
bilization of the exchange rate (i.e., a rise in E(ε) and a fall in σ
ε) have weak ef-
fects on interest rates, these regressions find little connection between (macroe-
conomic and exchange-rate) volatility and interest rates, which is surprising and 
merits further investigation.  There is also evidence to suggest that the effect of a   26
reduction in the rate of depreciation (a rise in APPR) is larger for deposit rates 
than for lending rates, and that credit market frictions may account for part of 
this difference. 
3.2  Regressions with Capital Inflows as the Dependent Variable 
Historically, countries that are affected by macroeconomic or exchange 
rate instability have little access to the international financial market: they are 
credit-rationed at the prevailing interest rate, and higher interest rates do not re-
duce the degree of credit rationing.  Stabilization, on the other hand (modeled 
here as a higher E(ε) or a lower σ
ε) has often been accompanied to renewed 
access to international capital markets.  Theory suggests that capital inflows 
should be affected by more or less the same factors that affect the lending rate in 
our models.  We hypothesize that countries were credit rationing is more severe 
(maybe due to financial market imperfections), the variability of appreciation 
rates or of output will have a large (negative) impact on capital flows.   
Modifying equation (6) to solve for the determinants of L, 
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we see that L depends negatively on the losses from default (foreclosure costs, 
macroeconomic instability), on the probability of default (and therefore on the 
volatility of the exchange rate), and on the opportunity cost of funds; it depends 
positively on the domestic loan rate and the appreciation rate.   27
We use the almost the same data and model as in the previous subsection, 
but replacing the lending rate with the ratio of the Financial Account to GDP as a 
measure of capital flows, where the data are obtained from the IFS for the same 
set of countries as in the regressions above, excepting France, Germany, Japan, 
and the United Kingdom, whose capital flows are several orders of magnitude 
above the rest of the sample; Belgium was excluded because it did not report Fi-
nancial Account figures for during the sample period.  We also add the deposit 
rate as the one of the explanatory variables as one of the determinants of capital 
flows.  On the hypothesis that interest rates are relatively sticky, we expect them 
to be statistically insignificant.  The results are reported in Tables A.4 - A.5. 
The regressions find mixed support for the hypotheses, yet the results are 
robust to changes in the specification of the model.    Once the other variables are 
accounted for, neither the opportunity cost of funds (measured by the Fed Funds 
rate) nor the domestic deposit rates are significant predictors of capital inflows.  
As this paper’s model predicts, the appreciation rate is a strong predictor of in-
flows (funds are attracted by higher APPR, i.e., lower depreciation rates, which 
may indicate a stabilization of the currency). 
STDAP is always of the expected sign and more significant when includ-
ing the interaction with CRED (but not when interacted with CRDRAT); STDAP 
loses significance marginally when the interaction term of the standard deviation 
of GDP with CRDRAT is present.   28
STDGDP is always of the expected sign and strongly significant when by 
itself or when interacted with CRDRAT: it becomes marginally insignificant 
when an interaction with CRED is included (but it keeps the expected sign).  This 
suggests, in a manner consistent with the theoretical model of this paper, that 
(even if lending rates are relatively insensitive to exchange-rate stabilization) 
capital inflows are attracted by economic stability and that financial frictions are 
important in determining the response of capital flows to exchange-rate stabiliza-
tion. 
CRDRAT is always of the expected sign and it is statistically significant 
(unless the interaction with STDAP is included). STDAP*CRDRAT is always of 
the expected sign, although insignificant at conventional levels.  One can tenta-
tively infer that credit-market frictions may have an effect on how the behavior 
of the exchange rate affects the financial market. 
On the other hand, CRED is a poor predictor of capital inflows, both by it-
self and interacted with STDGDP or with STDAP.  All CRED coefficients, by 
themselves and interacted, have the wrong sign.  This would imply that coun-
tries with stronger effective creditor rights (that is, countries where (1-CRED) is 
lower) would suffer larger capital outflows, and that this effect increases if 
STDAP or STDGDP increased, compared to countries with weaker effective cred-
itor rights.  The model suggests that these countries would experience outflows in 
the wake of stabilization.  This is especially puzzling since it was found that 
countries that have more exchange-rate volatility tend to have weaker creditor   29
rights.  Given the problems with the CRED measure mentioned above, one is 
tempted to discard this result as an aberration. 
For the reasons mentioned above, CRED is unlikely to be a perfect meas-
ure of creditor rights.  Tornell and Westermann’s CRDRAT does relatively better, 
but its performance is not stellar.  Work in developing a better measure is still 
needed. 
It is also clear that capital inflows (rather lending rates) change with 
changes in the expected profitability of lending, which is determined, in turn, by 
macroeconomic stability, exchange rate stabilization, and efficient credit markets. 
This is consistent with they hypothesis that credit market imperfections cause 
interest rates to be sticky (although this conclusion is by no means inescapable). 
We ran additional regressions (with the same variables) on restricted 
samples, focusing on Latin American, Asian, European, and African countries, 
and a final set of regressions on the sample excluding European and African 
countries.  Most variables were fairly insignificant in the African and European 
samples: other explanations must be found for capital flows to these countries.  
The results discussed above held up in the Latin American and Asian samples, 
and on the common Latin American-Asian sample. 
4.  Conclusion 
This paper has given theoretical and empirical support to the hypothesis 
that a) a stabilization of the exchange rate should lead to a reduction in both the   30
average rate of depreciation and its standard deviation; b) that these factors may 
reduce the cost of credit in the absence of credit rationing; c) that these factors 
may reduce the incidence of credit rationing if present. 
The theoretical model was based on canonical studies of the financial sec-
tor, in the spirit of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (BGG 1998), simplified to 
draw attention to the role of currency mismatch: foreign-currency denominated 
loans and domestic-currency denominated income, which gives centrality to the 
behavior of the exchange rate.  Given the fact that a volatility of the exchange 
rate should cause more defaults in the model, it was argued that exchange-rate 
stabilization should lower interest rates –or, in the presence of credit rationing, 
increase the availability of credit. 
This was then tested using Tornell and Westermann’s (2001) hypothesized 
measure of credit market frictions and Galindo and Micco’s (2001) measure of 
creditor rights as proxies for financial frictions and financial data from a large 
sample of countries.  The regressions gave some support to the theoretical model: 
the standard deviation of the appreciation rate does affect capital inflows (much 
more significantly than it affects lending rates, which in turn are affected more 
than deposit rates), which is consistent with the hypothesis that credit market 
imperfections cause international lending rates to be sticky.  This effect was 
found to be affected by the presence of financial frictions. 
An immediate implication of these findings is that ERBS programs are 
likely to affect aggregate demand not by reducing the cost of credit (which, em-  31
pirically, does not fall by much after ERBS programs are instituted, even if depo-
sit rates do fall) but by increasing the availability of funds.  Because this relation-
ship is due to frictions in the credit market, an ERBS program that is accompa-
nied by a reform of the financial sector aimed at reducing frictions (e.g., improv-
ing the quality of information, of banking regulation, of bankruptcy courts, etc.) 
should lead to an even larger initial expansion of credit and of aggregate de-
mand. 
The results of this paper are not, however, indisputable.  More work is ne-
cessary to find and test better proxies for financial frictions and for different 
ways in which a stabilization of the exchange rate may affect financial relations.  
Better and more abundant data on liability dollarization would improve the em-
pirical tests. 
An additional test of these hypotheses, also left for further work, is to limit 
the period of study and the selection of countries to ERBS episodes, focusing on 
whether financial reform accompanied this program.  Of particular importance is 
whether this financial reform increased financial frictions (say, by increasing 
moral hazard) or reduced them (say, by implementing better accounting stan-
dards).   32
 
5.  Appendix: Data and Regression Results 
Notes: LEND is the country’s lending rate, reported in the International Financial Statis-
tics Online database of the International Monetary Fund, measured in percentage points per an-
num.  KINFG is the ratio of the country’s financial account to nominal GDP measured in dollars 
(calculated by multiplying nominal GDP in national currency by the exchange rate defined as 
U.S. dollars per units of national currency).  Financial account, nominal GDP, and exchange rate 
figures are drawn from the IFS, measured in millions of US dollars.  FEDFUNDS is the US Feder-
al Funds rate, obtained from the Federal Reserve website, and measured in percentage points per 
annum.  APPR is the annual change of the exchange rate, defined as units of foreign currency per 
unit of domestic currency, measured in percentage points.  1 - CRED is a redefinition of Galindo 
and Micco’s (2001) effective credit rights, which take values between 0 and 1: higher values of 1-
CRED indicate lower effective creditor rights.  CRDRAT is constructed following Tornell and 
Westermann (2001) suggestion that credit-market imperfections can be measured by the correla-
tion between the real exchange rate and the rate of growth of real domestic credit: a higher value 
of this correlation indicates greater credit-market imperfections.  5-year correlations were used.  
STDAP is the standard deviation of APPR between t and t-5, measured in percentage points.  
STDGDP is the standard deviation of GDPbetween t and t-5. 
 
Table A.0 
Galindo and Micco’s (2001) measure of Effective Creditor Rights (CRED). 
All figures between 0 and 1  Creditor Rights  Rule of Law 
Effective Creditor 
Rights 
Argentina 0.25 0.58 0.14
Australia 0.25 0.9 0.22
Austria 0.75 0.95 0.71
Belgium 0.5 0.7 0.35
Belize 0.5 0.52 0.26
Bolivia 0.5 0.41 0.21
Brazil 0.25 0.44 0.11
Canada 0.25 0.89 0.22
Chile 0.25 0.77 0.19
China,P.R.: Hong Kong  1 0.83 0.83
Colombia 0 0.3 0
Costa Rica  0.25 0.64 0.16
Denmark 0.75 0.92 0.69
Dominican Republic  0.25 0.59 0.15
Ecuador 0.25 0.32 0.08
E g y p t  10 . 5 30 . 5 3
El Salvador  0.5 0.34 0.17
Finland 0.25 0.93 0.23
France 0 0.77 0
Germany 0.75 0.87 0.65
Greece 0.25 0.62 0.16
Guatemala 0.25 0.22 0.06
H a i t i  0 . 50 . 1 30 . 0 6  33
I n d i a  10 . 5 40 . 5 4
Indonesia 1 0.27 0.27
Ireland 0.25 0.85 0.21
I s r a e l  10 . 7 40 . 7 4
Italy 0.5 0.72 0.36
Jamaica 0.25 0.32 0.08
Japan 0.5 0.86 0.43
K e n y a  10 . 1 90 . 1 9
K o r e a  10 . 4 10 . 4 1
M a l a y s i a  10 . 7 10 . 7 1
Mexico 0 0.38 0
Netherlands 0.5 0.9 0.45
New Zealand  0.75 0.96 0.72
N i c a r a g u a  0 . 50 . 3 20 . 1 6
N i g e r i a  10 . 2 30 . 2 3
N o r w a y  0 . 50 . 9 60 . 4 8
P a k i s t a n  10 . 3 10 . 3 1
Panama 0.75 0.4 0.3
Paraguay 0.25 0.33 0.08
Peru 0 0.37 0
Philippines 0 0.48 0
Portugal 0.25 0.77 0.19
Singapore 0.75 0.98 0.74
South Africa  0.75 0.74 0.55
S p a i n  0 . 50 . 7 60 . 3 8
Sri Lanka  0.75 0.41 0.31
Sweden 0.5 0.91 0.45
Switzerland 0.25 1 0.25
Taiwan 0.5 0.73 0.37
Thailand 0.75 0.6 0.45
Trinidad and Tobago  0.75 0.63 0.47
Turkey 0.5 0.5 0.25
U n i t e d  K i n g d o m   10 . 9 20 . 9 2
United States  0.25 0.81 0.2
Uruguay 0.25 0.57 0.14
Venezuela 0.5 0.33 0.17
Z i m b a b w e  10 . 4 60 . 4 6  34
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